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Do Individual Perceptions of Group Cohesion Reflect Shared Beliefs?  




The primary purpose of the study was to use the index of agreement to examine the 
degree to which individual perceptions of cohesiveness reflect shared beliefs for group 
cohesion in sport teams.  The secondary purposes were to examine how the type of 
cohesion, the task interactive nature of the group, and the absolute level of cohesion are 
related to the index of agreement. Teams (n = 192 containing 2107 athletes) were tested 
on the Group Environment Questionnaire.  The average index of agreement values were 
greater for the Group integration (GI) manifestations of cohesiveness (GI-task, rwg(j) = 
.721; GI-social, rwg(j) = .694) than for the Individual attractions to the group (ATG) 
manifestations (ATG-task, rwg(j) = .621; ATG-social, rwg(j) = .563).  No differences were 
found in index of agreement values for teams differentiated on the basis of task 
interdependence (i.e., interactive sport teams versus coactive/independent sport teams). 
Finally, a consistent pattern of relationships was observed between the absolute level of 
cohesiveness and the index of agreement; consensus increased as the amount of 
cohesiveness present in the team increased.  The results were discussed in terms of their 
implication for the aggregation of individual perceptions of cohesion to represent the 
group construct.   
KEYWORDS: Task type; Consensus; Sport teams; Group Environment Questionnaire 
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Do Individual Perceptions of Group Cohesion Reflect Shared Beliefs?  
An Empirical Analysis 
In his contemporary review of group cohesion, Dion (2000) provided a selective 
historical tour of the rich history of multidisciplinary investigations associated with the 
construct of group cohesion.  He noted that social psychology, as one of the investigative 
disciplines, brought its distinctive focus upon conceptualization, measurement and 
validity issues to the examination of the cohesion phenomenon.  As he correctly 
emphasized, these issues continue to be important if the research on cohesion is to 
advance.  The objective of the present article is to focus on one such issue–the notion that 
cohesion, when conceptualized and measured through the perceptions of individuals 
within the group, represents the shared beliefs of the membership.  As Dion (2000) has 
aptly noted, cohesion is clearly important in sport and exercise groups.  In the present 
study, naturally-formed groups are used to quantitatively illustrate the degree of sharing 
that occurs in beliefs about cohesion.  In order to appreciate the importance of this 
demonstration, some background about shared beliefs in groups, its link to cohesion, and 
its statistical representation is in order. 
Shared Beliefs and Group Cohesion 
The notion that members of a group share beliefs about maters of importance has 
been linked to the investigation of cohesion for some time.  For example, in their classic 
study of housing units, Festinger, Schacter, and Back (1950) reasoned that if the group 
used its cohesion to influence its members to think and act alike, then cohesion should be 
related to group homogeneity of attitudes and behavior.  Another example is found in 
cohesion studies of Janis’s (1982) “groupthink” concept that stresses the single 
mindedness of thinking (i.e., sharing) that is characteristic of some groups (e.g., not 
willing to consider perspectives other than the group’s). Groupthink has been shown to be 
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both encouraged and countered by different types of cohesion (Bernthal & Insko, 1993).  
Both of these examples reflect the idea of individual members of small groups holding 
common (shared) perceptions. Not surprisingly, investigators have assumed that 
members’ responses would be similar within more cohesive groups and that this 
commonality can be measured. 
The social psychological literature is replete with different ways to measure 
cohesion (cf., Dion, 2000).  One approach has been to measure the perceptions of 
individual group members about the degree to which various dimensions of cohesion are 
present in the group.  Then, depending upon the nature of the research question, the 
individual responses have been aggregated and the resultant measures then assumed to 
reflect the cohesion of the entire group.  Dion (2000) described two programs of research 
that exemplify this approach. For example, Bollen and Hoyle (1990) developed a two -
dimensional conceptualization of cohesion that concerns belongingness and morale.  In 
commenting on their approach, Dion (2000) noted that at the individual’s level, perceived 
cohesion represents the group’s role for its members. Furthermore, combining the 
individual perceptions represents a group level view of cohesion.  Perceived cohesion, 
from the Bollen and Hoyle viewpoint, applies to both small and large groups.  
 Dion (2000) also described another approach to measuring perceived cohesion in 
sport groups.  Four aspects of cohesion have been proposed by Carron, Widmeyer, and 
Brawley (1985) within their cohesion inventory, the Group Environment Questionnaire 
(GEQ).  Considerable sport–related evidence for the construct validity of the GEQ has 
accumulated since its development (Carron, Brawley, & Widmeyer, 1998).  A 
fundamental assumption of the Carron et al. approach is that “perceptions about the group 
held by a group member are a reasonable estimate of various aspects of unity 
characteristic of the group” (Carron et al., 1998, p.217).  Another basic assumption is that 
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these beliefs are shared.  Group (team) members are given 18 statements pertaining to 4 
manifestations of task or social cohesiveness and asked to indicate their level of 
agreement on a 9-point scale.  Typically, group member responses to the GEQ have been 
used either independently (e.g., to examine relationships between individual perceptions 
of group cohesion and individual adherence behavior; Carron, Widmeyer, & Brawley, 
1988) or have been aggregated to provide a group value (e.g., to examine relationships 
between team cohesion and team success; Carron, Bray, & Eys, 2002).  Both the Bollen 
and Hoyle (1990) and the Carron, Widmeyer and Brawley (1985) measures of cohesion 
have the common assumption that beliefs about cohesion are shared by group members. 
Sharing of Information in Groups 
Whether individual perceptions about cohesion represent shared beliefs could be 
questioned.  The idea of individuals sharing cognition or sharing beliefs about other 
aspects of group life frequently refers to both divisions of knowledge shared by members 
of a group and having some ideas in common.  In the former case, group members might 
have a common goal but divide the cognitive work into different areas of responsibility 
so that workload is shared in the group’s striving toward its common goal.  In the latter 
case, there is a common sense notion that members of the same group will share thoughts 
and beliefs because of common knowledge and experience.  However, as Cole (1991) 
noted, no one knows everything about their own group or their own culture.   
A reasonable question pertains to how much sharing of thoughts and beliefs 
occur within cohesive groups. The answer to this question may be that “it depends”.  
According to a review by Hinsz, Tindale and Vollrath (1997), task characteristics, group 
operating procedures, individual member background characteristics, member roles, and 
group norms all influence the information processing within a group, and as a 
consequence, the degree of sharing of information within a group.  As noted by Levine, 
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Resnick, and Higgins (1993), unless group members have a shared frame of reference for 
some information-processing objective, each group member may process information 
differently.  These factors could influence either an increased sharing of information or a 
heightened variability of individual member information processing. 
In support of the idea of shared beliefs is evidence from the comparison of group 
and individual-information processing (Hinsz et al, 1997).  Groups appear to use their 
information processing strategies more consistently and reliably than individuals.  As 
well, groups are more reliable in the cues they use to make their judgements—whether 
those judgments are correct or incorrect.   
Given the evidence on the various factors that moderate the degree of sharing, 
reasonable issues to investigate are a) whether groups always reflect the common sharing 
of beliefs frequently associated with group cohesion and b) whether this sharing is a 
matter of degree.  Donnelly, Carron, and Chelladurai (1978) have noted that by 
definition, all groups have some degree of group cohesion otherwise they would not exist 
as groups.  Thus, shared beliefs may not necessarily be reflected solely by completely 
common responses to questions about a group’s cohesion.   
The idea that there may be a range in the degree of sharing in beliefs about 
cohesion should also be considered in what we expect from the data gathered with 
different measures of cohesion.  As Dion (2000) has pointed out, there are several 
theoretically-driven measures of cohesion that attempt to capture its multiple dimensions.  
He also noted that cohesiveness could mean different things for different groups 
depending upon the goals and tasks of the group.  Therefore, high expectations for 
commonality of responses to measures reflecting multiple dimensions of cohesion might 
not be realistic.  Finally, as Hinsz et al (1997) illustrated, even the response mode, 
measure or type of scale affect group responses.  For example, expecting within-group 
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consensus on dichotomous response scales about a single construct (e.g., yes/no; 
guilty/not guilty) may be probable.  Conversely, group consensus on multiple dimensions 
of a construct assessed with a response scale that has interval or continuous response 
properties (e.g., 1 = strongly disagree to 9 = strongly agree) may be less probable.   
The degree of sharing becomes critical to important decisions about whether to 
aggregate measures of individual member perceptions of cohesion to the group level (i.e., 
for research questions that concern the group as the unit of analysis).  Many authors have 
argued that a demonstration of agreement among group members regarding their 
responses or judgements about their group is essential before stating that a concept is a 
“group level” phenomenon (e.g.,James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1992; Moritz & Watson, 
1998).  Indeed, Guzzo, Yost, Campbell, and Shea (1993) have noted that low consensus 
(i.e., minimal shared beliefs) on a topic may be an indication that a group is not of 
consequence to its members or that it may reflect that the unity of the group is in doubt.  
Also, Moritz and Watson (1998) have suggested that groups be excluded from group 
analyses when they have “insufficient intermember agreement” (p. 296).  Thus, the 
demonstration of agreement prior to aggregating individual perceptions about group 
cohesion is important. However, what is not clear is what level of agreement is sufficient 
to conclude that shared beliefs are present.  
The Index of Agreement 
Over the past 20 years, a number of statistical protocols have evolved that 
permit researchers to empirically test the degree of sharing reflected by the consensus of 
group members (see Moritz & Watson, 1998, for an overview).  One of these statistical 
protocols is the index of agreement (rwg(j), James, 1982; James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984; 
Kozlowski & Hattrup, 1992; see also Schmidt & Hunter, 1989). Essentially, the index of 
agreement provides a statistical measure of the degree to which a set of individuals (e.g., 
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a team) is in consensus about a target stimulus (e.g., an item about the team’s level of 
cohesiveness). Mathematically, rwg(j) is defined as a “proportion of systematic variance in 
a set of judgements in relation to the total variance in the judgments” (James et al., 1984, 
p. 86).  
Kozlowski and Hattrup (1992) pointed out that some researchers have tended to 
(inappropriately) use the terms interater reliability and interrater agreement 
interchangeably.  They cautioned that this confuses consistency (reliability) with 
consensus (agreement). Reliability is correlational in nature and reflects the proportional 
consistency among raters.  Thus, for example, one member of a triad might respond with 
a 9 (on a 9-point scale) for all 4 cohesion items in a scale, another member might respond 
with a 5 for all 4 items, while the third might respond with a 1. Although reliability (i.e., 
internal consistency) would be perfect--because raters were consistent across items and 
the differences among raters were proportionally consistent--agreement would be 
nonexistent--because no consensus was present among the three raters.  The converse 
also could be true. That is, if all three members of the triad responded to all 4 items with 
a 7, internal consistency would be zero but consensus would be perfect. 
If the index of agreement can be used to assess shared beliefs, the question that 
then arises pertains to the magnitude of rwg(j) necessary to support the assumption of 
within-group consensus. As is the case with every other type of statistical test, there is no 
simple answer.  In their overview of statistical procedures used to test for the presence of 
“groupness” in individual data, Moritiz and Watson (1998) offered this suggestion: 
if one adopts the James et al. (1984) approach, in which group members 
are viewed as multiple judges rating the same stimulus, then guidelines 
from classical test theory can be applied to inform the judgment of 
whether an observed level of interrater agreement is sufficient.  Nunnally 
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(1978) stated that the sufficiency of a measure’s reliability depends on the 
use to which the measure is put and that, generally, reliability of .50 and 
.80 can be quite sufficient for research purposes but coefficients in excess 
of .90 may be required for certain applied purposes. (p. 291) 
Moritz and Watson are to be commended for advancing a prescription but one 
limitation in its application, however, is that the index of agreement (rwg(j)) is not a 
reliability coefficient.   Thus, any prescriptions pertaining to an acceptable magnitude that 
might be applicable to statistics such as Cronbach alpha (or intraclass correlations, 
Spearman-Brown correlation coefficients, test-retest reliability coefficients, etc.) are not 
necessarily pertinent for the index of agreement.  
The primary purpose of the study was to use the index of agreement (rwg(j)) to 
examine the degree to which individual perceptions of cohesiveness reflect shared beliefs 
for group cohesion in sport teams.  A secondary purpose was to examine the influence of 
various group factors on the index of agreement; the specific factors are discussed below. 
In order to reliably establish the range and magnitude of shared beliefs in any 
construct, four conditions must be present.  Two of these pertain to the conditions 
necessary to calculate an index of agreement (James et al., 1984).  First, the inventory 
must “have acceptable psychometric properties (e.g., construct validity, internal 
consistency in the case of multiple items) in prior research … [and] the alternatives on an 
item’s measurement scale [must be] approximately equally spaced” (James et al., 1984, p. 
85). The Group Environment Questionnaire (GEQ), the inventory used to test team 
cohesion in the present study, satisfies these two conditions (see Carron, Brawley, & 
Widmeyer, 1998).   
Two other conditions are related to the nature of the sample. That is, in order to 
have confidence in the results, the sample should be large and heterogeneous in order to 
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eliminate questions associated with both power (e.g., are the results simply a reflection of 
the small number of teams tested?) and generalizability (e.g., are the results simply a 
reflection of the type of sport examined?). The sample used in the present study--192 
teams, comprised of 2107 athletes, from a broad cross section of interactive, independent, 
and coactive sports—satisfies these two conditions. 
  Insofar as the secondary purpose was concerned, the influence of three factors 
on the index of agreement was examined. These included the type of cohesion measure, 
the nature of the group, and the nature of the group’s absolute cohesiveness.   
Type of Cohesion 
 The Group Environment Questionnaire (GEQ, Brawley et al., 1987; Carron et 
al., 1985; Widmeyer et al., 1985), the operational definition of cohesion used, assesses 
two predominant types of cognitions. One of these, group integration, represents the 
individual’s perceptions about the closeness, similarity, and bonding within the group as 
a whole. Thus, the items pertain to issues associated with “we” and “us”. The other, 
individual attractions to the group, represents the individual's perceptions about personal 
motivations acting to retain him or her in the group. Thus, the items pertain to issues 
associated with “I” and “me”.   There are also two fundamental orientations in a group 
member's perceptions: task and social. Thus, the GEQ assesses four manifestations of 
cohesion in sport teams: Group integration-task (GI-T), Group integration-social (GI-S), 
Individual attractions to the group-task (ATG-T), and Individual attractions to the group-
social (ATG-S).  After reviewing a number of different conceptualisations of cohesion, 
Dion (2000) concluded that task and social dimensions were central to a 




Sport teams are by their very nature task oriented. Most teams practice and 
prepare for competitions from one to two hours daily and compete at least once a week. 
Thus, although social interactions are prevalent and important in all groups including 
sport teams, the major focus and majority of interactions in sport are task-related.  Also, 
as indicated above, the two group integration constructs (GI-T and GI-S) require a 
judgment about a general state of the group while the individual attractions constructs 
(ATG-T and ATG-S) require a judgment that is more personal and idiosyncratic. Also, 
the task interactions are more of a predominant group concern than social interactions. 
Thus, it was hypothesized that the construct showing the strongest shared beliefs would 
be GI-T and the construct showing the weakest would be ATG-S.  
No hypotheses were advanced about the relative ranking of the other two 
cohesion constructs—ATG-T and GI-S. This was primarily because the aspects of 
cohesion can vary in how strongly they are developed depending, for example, upon a 
number of factors such as the level of team development, the tenure of membership on 
the team, the type of member task interaction demanded by the sport (i.e., coactive or 
interactive) and the size of the team (Carron & Brawley, 2000).  In a sample as large and 
diverse as that utilized in the present study, it seemed that a priori hypotheses about the 
aspects of cohesion where the greatest and least sharing would be present were tenable. 
Nature of the Group 
Sports differ in the degree to which task interdependence is permitted or 
required for team success.  At one end of a continuum lie independent sport teams. Thus, 
for example, while high schools, universities and countries routinely enter track and field 
teams in competitions, the rules of the sport mandate that every event must be carried out 
by a sole individual except for relay races where the nature and amount of 
interdependence is clearly stipulated. Also, a team score is the additive product of the 
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success of each individual athlete.  Coactive sport teams fall farther along the continuum 
of interactions.  Thus, for example, in rowing teams, members perform coordinative 
actions but the nature of the task requires a simultaneous synchronized response.  
Conversely, in sports such as basketball, team members are mutually dependent on one 
another, task interactions of a variable changing nature, are inherent, and greater 
cooperation and coordination typically result in better performance.    
Shared beliefs should be stronger in situations where more complex task 
interdependence is fundamental to the nature of the group’s success.  Thus, it was 
hypothesized that the stronger shared beliefs would be evident in interactive team sports 
(e.g., volleyball, basketball) than in coactive/independent sports (e.g., swimming, 
wrestling).  
Absolute Level of Cohesion in the Group 
 The index of agreement reflects the relative degree of consensus present in 
member’s perceptions of the group. High consensus could result if almost all members 
perceived that the group had high cohesion, or moderate cohesion, or low cohesion.  
Cohesion at either of the two extremes is likely a product of unusual distinctive 
situations—a catastrophe, consistent success, consistent failure, objections to the group’s 
leadership, and so on. Cohesion of a moderate level is likely a product of more 
ambiguous situations—partial success, inconsistent leadership, and so on. Research in 
human perception has shown that stimuli or situations that are more distinctive are more 
noticeable (Hinsz et al, 1997; Kahneman, 1973; Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Triesman, 
1988). By extension, it could be expected that consensus should be greater in situations 
where groups are relatively high or low in cohesiveness than in situations that are more 
ambiguous. Thus, it was hypothesized that the index of agreement would be greater when 





GEQ cohesion data files from multiple investigations were combined to 
produce the sample.  These data files originally were collected for research 
projects leading to either refereed publications or dissertations/theses. Generally, 
the studies were carried out under the supervision of or in collaboration with one 
of the two principal authors1.  Data were obtained from active intact teams (i.e., 
versus individuals representing teams or recollecting team cohesion).  In total, 
cohesion data considered as collected and scored in reliable fashion as 
recommended by Carron et al, (1985, 1998, 2002) were obtained for 2107 athletes 
from 192 teams.  Any data not meeting these criteria were not included in the 
final sample.  The athletes had been members of their respective teams for 
31.57+20.97 months. From an individual athlete perspective, female athletes 
comprised 46.4% of the sample (mean age = 21.09+3.35); male athletes, 53.6% 
(mean age = 20.77+2.75). 
The teams competed predominantly at the university-level (n = 147) with 
a substantially smaller number competing in clubs (n = 42), intramurals (n = 2), 
and professional sport (n = 1). The types of sports represented included ice 
hockey (n = 41), volleyball (n = 33), basketball (n = 31), tennis (n = 17), netball 
(n = 15), soccer (n = 14), cricket (n = 13), ringette (n = 9), cheerleading (n = 5), 
track and field (n = 3), dance, synchronized swimming, and rugby (n = 2 in each), 
and field hockey, rowing, swimming, precision skating, and wrestling (n = 1 in 
each).   
To explore one of the issues under investigation, the various sports also were 
classified into one of two categories on the basis of the relative amount of task 
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interdependence required to successfully achieve the team’s goals. The sports forming 
the interdependent category (n = 159 teams) included hockey, volleyball, basketball, 
netball, soccer, ringette, rugby, and field hockey. The sports forming the 
coactive/independent category (n = 32) included tennis, cricket, cheerleading, track and 
field, dance, synchronized swimming, precision skating, swimming, and wrestling. In 
the case of the one rowing team, it was not possible to ascertain after the fact whether 
the athletes had competed in singles events or as a crew.  Consequently, these data were 
not used in the analyses.   
Measure 
As indicated above, the Group Environment Questionnaire (GEQ; Carron et al., 
1985) was used to assess cohesion.  The GEQ is a self-report questionnaire that contains 
18 items.  Four aspects of cohesion are assessed: Individual attractions to the group-task 
(ATG-T, 4 items), Individual attractions to the group-social (ATG-S, 5 items), Group 
integration-task (GI-T, 5 items) and Group integration-social (GI-s, 4 items). Responses 
are obtained on a 9-point Likert-type scale anchored at the extremes by “strongly 
disagree” (1) and “strongly agree” (9).  Thus, larger scores reflect stronger perceptions 
of cohesiveness. The Cronbach alpha values computed with the sample used in the 
present study were ATG-S (α = 0.610), ATG-T (α  = 0.715), GI-T (α  = 0.715) and GI-
S (α  = 0.761).   
The alpha value for ATG-S was slightly lower than would typically be 
considered acceptable for research purposes (Nunnally, 1978).  However, as was pointed 
out above, consensus (agreement) and reliability (internal consistency) are independent 
constructs (Kozlowski & Hattrup, 1992).  It is possible to have high internal consistency 
and little consensus or vice versa.  Because we were interested in consensus in the 
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present study, the ATG-S was retained in the analyses.   
 
Procedures: Data collection 
Although the data were obtained from a number of individual research projects, a 
series of general principles were adhered to in each study.  These principles are part of 
the protocol used to collect cohesion data in our laboratories and they are briefly 
outlined below.   
Coaches were contacted, the purpose of the study explained, and permission was 
sought to approach athletes for their participation in the study.  When the coach’s 
permission was secured, the investigators met with the athletes to explain the study and  
request their participation.  In every instance, individual participation was voluntary and 
informed consent was obtained from all participants.  In cases where individuals were 
under the age of 18, parental consent also was obtained.   
Questionnaires were administered at a convenient team meeting or practice that 
was neither immediately before nor after a competition in order to avoid competition-
specific biases in responses.  Although all members of each team completed the 
questionnaire at a group meeting, the importance of independent responses was stressed 
in instructions at the time of administration.  Participants were required to complete their 
questionnaires on their own and without conversation with their teammates.   
Procedure: Statistical Analyses 
Nonadjusted index of agreement.  The index of agreement (rwg(j)) reflects the 
proportion of systematic variance resulting from common judgments of a target stimulus 
in relation to the total variance (James et al., 1984). Consistent with the protocol 
outlined by James (1982) and James et al. (1984), the average item variance was used to 
represent the systematic variance (e.g., in the case of ATG-T, this was the average 
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variance from the four items in the scale). The total variance—which is referred to 
hereafter as the expected variance—also was computed using formulae outlined by 
James et al. (1984). 
The formula used to compute the expected variance is based on the assumption 
that all options of the measurement scale (e.g., all 9 choices available to participants 
responding to GEQ items) have an equal likelihood of being chosen.  As a consequence, 
the expected variance is also referred to as a rectangular or null distribution.  
 Adjusted index of agreement. James et al. (1984) also pointed out that there are 
instances where the assumption of a rectangular distribution might be unwarranted. That 
is, systematic bias might be present in the responses simply because of response set, 
social desirability, or positive leniency. Given that the index of agreement takes into 
account the amount of systematic variance in relation to the total (expected) variance, 
any systematic bias present because of positive leniency, for example, could lead to an 
inflated index of agreement.  Consequently, an adjusted index of agreement is computed 
taking into account the nature of the biased distribution.   
Typically, the nature and degree of bias are estimated--the data set under 
investigation is not used to determine if the distribution of responses is biased (skewed).  
However, the present data set was obtained from (a) an exceptionally large number of 
individual respondents, (b) an exceptionally large number and variety of teams and (c) a 
large number of investigations and investigators. Thus, rather than estimate the amount 
of bias, the data were used and the proportions of responses to each of the 9-choices for 
all of the four scales of the GEQ were computed.  The results are summarized in Table 
1. It is evident that the distributions for each of the four scales are positively skewed 
with athletes showing an increased likelihood of responding at the top half of the scale.  
Therefore, using protocol outlined by James et al. (1984), and the proportions presented 
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in Table 1, an adjusted index of agreement also was computed that took into account the 
statistical bias in the expected variance.  It is worth noting that the “true” index of 
agreement is generally considered to fall in the range between the adjusted and 
nonadjusted values (James et al., 1984). 
Out of range values. The expected variance is a theoretical (computed) value that 
is based on the assumption of a random selection of responses to the 9-point scale (i.e., 
thereby producing the so-called rectangular distribution).  As a consequence, the 
expected variance is typically greater than the computed systematic variance.  On 
occasion, however, members of a group could exhibit considerable disagreement about 
the target stimulus (e.g., the cohesiveness of the group).  If this was the case, the 
systematic variance would turn out to be greater than the expected variance.  When this 
occurs, rwg(j) assumes values outside the range of .00 to 1.00.  James et al. (1984) have 




 Table 2 contains a summary of the nonadjusted and adjusted index of 
agreement values.  It is apparent that the index of agreement varies widely between 
teams (i.e., range from rwg(j) = 0 to .970) and across the four types of cohesion. As Table 
2 shows, GI-T and GI-S were the cohesion constructs showing the greatest amount of 
shared beliefs among team members, especially for the nonadjusted values; ATG-S was 
the cohesion construct where shared beliefs were the lowest.  Also, if rwg(j) = .50 is used 
as a cut-off point, a greater percentage of teams showed lower agreement for ATG-T and 
ATG-S than for GI-T and GI-S.  Typically, a greater percentage of teams exhibited a 
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serious lack of consensus (i.e., rwg(j) = .00) for ATG-T and ATG-S than for GI-T and GI-
S.   
 One question that does arise is whether the nonadjusted or adjusted index of 
agreement values better represent the extent to which shared beliefs about cohesion are 
present.  One possible answer lies in how the data in Table 1 are interpreted. James et al. 
(1984) cautioned that the presence of a skewed distribution such as is evident in Table 1 
does not automatically indicate the existence of response bias, positive leniency, or social 
desirability. If a target stimulus, an athlete’s performance for example, is clearly 
outstanding, all judges would/should rate it uniformly high. In this example, correcting 
for response bias would lead to an underestimation in the amount of agreement present.   
Similarly, the data in Table 1 may not reflect positive leniencies or response 
biases for cohesiveness—they may reflect the actual state of the situation being judged.  
As Donnelly et al. (1978) suggested, a non-cohesive group is literally a contradiction in 
terms.  If a group continues to exist, it must be cohesive to some extent.  Athletes actively 
and chronically involved in matters of importance to their teams might not use the full 
range of the 9-point cohesion scale because the lowest values (i.e., 1, 2, 3) simply would 
not be applicable.  Further, disenchanted team members who might be inclined to 
perceive their group in a highly negative light are likely to withdraw from membership. If 
the tenure of group membership of the present sample is any indication, the athletes were 
not disenchanted team members.  The average tenure at the time of testing was 31½ 
months.  Also, approximately 75% of the sample had been members of their team for 
over 12 months.  Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the athletes likely valued their 
membership because they maintained their involvement over a number of years.   
There is no empirical way to determine if the skewness in response on the GEQ 
(presented in Table 1) is a product of positive leniency, social desirability, response 
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distortion, or other factors. However, the nature of the cohesion construct coupled with 
the duration of team membership of the athletes lead us to believe that the data in Table 
1 most likely reflect the athletes’ objective perception of the nature of their team’s 
cohesiveness. As a consequence, we also believe that the nonadjusted index of 
agreement values reported here best reflect the extent of shared beliefs in cohesiveness 
in sport teams.  Both unadjusted and adjusted statistics are presented to illustrate the 
range of possible values. 
Type of Cohesion 
 In order to compare the magnitude of the nonadjusted indexes of agreement for 
the four measures of cohesion, a one-way MANOVA was computed.  The Wilks’ 
Lambda was significant, F(3, 189) = 18.72, p < .001; η2 = .23. Post hoc Bonferroni 
analyses showed that the index of agreement values for GI-T and GI-S were 
significantly larger than for both ATG-S and ATG-T (p < .03).  Further, the nonadjusted 
index of agreement values for GI-T and GI-S were not significantly different from each 
other; nor were those for ATG-T and ATG-S.  Thus, the hypothesis that the strongest 
shared beliefs would be evidenced with GI-T and the weakest would be with ATG-S 
was supported for the nonadjusted index of agreement values. 
Different results were obtained when the adjusted index of agreement values 
were analysed. Although the overall Wilks Lambda was again significant, F(3,198) =  
6.21, p < .001, η2 = .09,  post hoc Bonferroni analyses showed that the adjusted index of 
agreement value for GI-S was significantly greater than the values for both ATG-S (p < 
.001) and GI-T (p < .05); there was no significant difference between GI-S and ATG-T. 
Also, the adjusted index of agreement values for GI-T, ATG-T, and ATG-S did not 
differ from one another.   
Nature of the Task 
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 Table 3 presents an overview of the index of agreement values for categories of 
teams classified on the basis of task interdependence.  Generally, teams that are 
coactive/independent showed slightly larger nonadjusted and adjusted index of 
agreement values.  However, MANOVA analyses with task type as the independent 
variable and the index of agreement for the four types of cohesion as the dependent 
variable showed that no significant differences (p > .05) were present.   
Absolute Level of Cohesion in the Group 
 In order to determine whether the absolute level of cohesiveness in a team 
influences the relative degree of consensus, a tertile split of the total sample (N= 192 
teams) was carried out independently with each of the four cohesion scales. For all four 
cohesion scales, the tertile split resulted in three categories of teams that differed 
significantly in amount of cohesion present (p < .001).  An overview of the cohesion 
scores and index of agreement values is provided in Table 4.  
As Table 4 shows, for the four GEQ scales the pattern of results was 
identical—the nonadjusted index of agreement increased as the absolute level of 
cohesiveness in the team increased.  A series of one-way ANOVA were computed with 
categories of teams varying in cohesion representing the independent variable and the 
nonadjusted index of agreement representing the dependent variable. In all four one-way 
ANOVA, significant difference (p < .001) was observed among the three categories of 
teams.   
Bonferroni post hoc analyses yielded a relatively consistent pattern of 
differences.  That is, for all four cohesion scales the teams possessing the highest and 
intermediate levels of cohesiveness had significantly (p at least .05) higher index of 
agreement values than teams possessing the lowest levels of cohesiveness. More 
specifically, for ATG-T and ATG-S only, the teams possessing the highest amounts of 
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cohesiveness also had significantly (p at least .05) greater index of agreement values 
than teams possessing the lowest levels of cohesiveness.  
 An examination of the adjusted index of agreement values in Table 4 shows 
similar linear pattern to the above. That is, the adjusted index of agreement values show 
an increase as cohesion increases.  When a series of one-way ANOVA were computed, 
again a significant difference (p < .001) was observed among the three categories of 
teams. 
Bonferroni post hoc analyses showed the identical pattern of significant results 
obtained for the nonadjusted index of agreement values.  That is, for all four cohesion 
scales the teams possessing the highest and intermediate levels of cohesiveness had 
significantly (p at least .05) higher index of adjusted agreement values than teams 
possessing the lowest levels of cohesiveness. In the case of ATG-T and ATG-S only, the 
teams possessing the highest amounts of cohesiveness also had significantly (p at least 
.05) greater adjusted index of agreement values than teams possessing the lowest levels 
of cohesiveness. These results failed to show support for the hypothesis that a 
curvilinear relationship between team cohesion levels and the index of agreement would 
be present (i.e., that consensus would be greater when team cohesion was high and low 
versus when team cohesion was at a moderate/intermediate level).  The results did show 
evidence for a linear relationship; consensus increases as team cohesiveness increases. 
Discussion 
 The general purpose of the study was to examine the range and absolute 
magnitude of shared beliefs--the index of agreement (rwg(j))—present for group cohesion 
in sport teams.  Within the framework of this general purpose, there were three secondary 
purposes--to examine how the type of cohesion, the task interactive nature of the group, 
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and the absolute level of cohesion present are related to the index of agreement exhibited 
for team cohesiveness. 
The results showed that the average nonadjusted index of agreement values varied 
from rwg(j) = .563 (ATG-S) to .721 (GI-T) and the adjusted index of agreement values 
from rwg(j) = .449 (ATG-S) to .558 (GI-S). With two exceptions, the median index of 
agreement values were above rwg(j) = .600 and with one exception, below rwg(j) = .800.  
One question that arises is what absolute magnitude of rwg(j) should researchers 
and practitioners use to conclude that groupness—a shared belief about cohesiveness--is 
present in any given team?  Based upon classical test theory (with collective efficacy as 
their prototype for shared belief), Moritz and Watson (1998) proposed that rwg(j) values in 
the range of .50 to .80 are likely sufficient for research purposes, but values above .90 
may be necessary for applied purposes. The latter value seems unreasonably high for the 
construct of cohesion as measured by the GEQ.  As Dion has pointed out, conceptually 
cohesion is a property of the group but it is manifested at the individual level in 
attractions to the group, to its members, to its tasks and goals. As Table 2 shows, if 
nonadjusted rwg(j) values above .50 are used as a criterion, 35.4%, 26.0%, 14.1%, and 
15.6% of the teams tested would be considered to have insufficient agreement in terms of 
ATG-S, ATG-T, GIS, and GI-T respectively to be considered a group.  When we know 
so little about the agreement characterizing the shared beliefs of real-world groups, and 
we consider the number of factors (e.g., nature of measurement scales, Hinsz et al, 1997) 
that can influence degree of agreement, it may be wise to consider different conventions 
for different research decisions.  At this early stage of research on cohesion-as-shared 
beliefs, the danger of making a Type II error by discarding data seems probable.  
What rwg(j)  values should be used in order to conclude that sufficient consensus is 
present and team members have shared beliefs relative to the various manifestations of 
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cohesiveness? Using the current sample and the nature of the GEQ as a basis, we propose 
that small, moderate and large degrees of groupness in perceptions of cohesion can be 
assumed to be present when nonadjusted rwg(j)  values of .40, .50 and .60 are present for 
ATG-T and ATG-S and nonadjusted rwg(j)  values of .50, .60 and .70 are present for GI-T 
and GI-S.  
The different standards proposed for the Individual attractions to the group ATG-
S and ATG-T) versus the Group integration  (GI-S and GI-T) manifestations of 
cohesiveness are based on the fact that the athlete’s focus is different for each (i.e., “me” 
in the case of the Individual attractions to the group subscales versus the “the group” in 
the case of the Group integration subscales).  Therefore, the amount of consensus that 
reasonably could be expected should also differ.  Klein, Conn, Smith, and Sorra (2001) 
pointed out that within-group consensus is strongly influenced by focus; that is, by where 
respondents are asked to direct their attention. Experiences or situations requiring “I”, 
“my”, and/or “me” evaluations encourage respondents to focus within themselves and 
disregard the experiences of other group members.  Conversely, experiences or situations 
requiring “we”, “us”, and/or “the team” evaluations encourage respondents to focus 
outside themselves and consider common experiences as a reference. Agreement should 
be higher in the latter than in the former case.   
The recommended index of agreement values for ATG-S and ATG-T may seem 
low.  However, it should be reemphasized that conceptually both ATG-S and ATG-T are 
considered to reflect a group property—why athletes cohere and stay united in pursuit of 
instrumental objectives and to satisfy affective needs (Carron et al., 1998).  If practical or 
research-oriented situations arise where aggregation of any of the four manifestations of 
cohesiveness is meaningful, removing teams from consideration because they fail to meet 
unreasonably high index of agreement standards is counterproductive. 
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In general, most group studies do not have the size of the database examined in 
the present study.  Most samples are considerably smaller and statistical analyses using 
the group as the unit of analysis may suffer a loss of power if conventions from classical 
test theory are used arbitrarily. Instead, we suggest that the data, the type of construct, 
and the nature of the research question should determine the selection of an agreement 
standard. 
 The three analyses associated with the secondary purposes of the study illustrate 
that the conditions under which individual consensus about cohesiveness is achieved 
within teams is complex. Consensus is more likely when athletes evaluate the collective 
unity around the task objectives (i.e., GI-T) and least likely when they evaluate how the 
team satisfies their own personal social needs (i.e., ATG-S).  These results support the  
Hinsz et al. (1997) contention that, “by their nature, groups are context sensitive and 
context situated” (p. 45). Intercollegiate and club-level sport teams are inherently task-
oriented; group success is a major priority for all teams. As a consequence, information 
associated with the team’s common task is more likely to be universally shared within the 
team than information about how the group satisfies each athlete’s personal social needs.  
Surprisingly, the results showed that the amount of interaction inherent in the 
nature of the sport is not related to the level of agreement about cohesiveness.  Within 
organizational psychology, a substantial body of research has shown that the amount of 
interaction in the group—either task or social—is positively related to increased 
similarity in perceptions, cognitions, and behavior (e.g., Klein et al., 2001; Salancik & 
Pfeffer, 1978; Walsh & Ungson, 1991; Weick, 1979).  Relative to the number of teams in 
the interactive category (n = 159), there were few teams in the coactive/independent 
category (n = 32). This may have been one factor in the failure to show differences. Also, 
however, perhaps the present results draw into question the assumption that there are 
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more task- and socially-related interactions that promote consensus in sports such as 
basketball than in sports such as track and field.  Alternatively, the present results may 
draw into question the assumption that the greater number of task- and socially-related 
interactions in sports such as basketball ipso facto lead to greater consensus about the 
team’s cohesiveness.     
The results also showed that the absolute level of cohesion present is strongly 
related to the average amount of consensus present. Team members are more likely to 
show higher consensus about their team’s cohesiveness when perceive that cohesiveness 
to be greater.  Despite the fact that a curvilinear relationship between consensus and 
cohesiveness was proposed, in hindsight our results may not be surprising.  It seems 
improbable that high consensus (i.e., shared agreement) about low cohesion could be 
measured while the team was still together.  An exception would be unique conditions 
that force a group together, yet encourage shared agreement on lack of cohesion.  If the 
psychological nature of the situation is sufficiently powerful, the wide individual 
differences in individual cognitions, behaviors, and affect are reduced and consistency 
across individuals results (Mischel, 1973). Thus, consensus and level of cohesion may be 
a unidirectional relationship in contrast to the relationship between member agreement 
and collective efficacy (i.e., strong agreement about either high or low collective 
efficacy) suggested by Moritz and Watson (1998).  
 The present results are interesting in light of Moritz and Watson’s (1998) 
response to their own question about what researchers should do if teams show no 
consensus:  
Guzzo, Yost, Campbell and Shea (1993) stated that low agreement may 
indicate that the group is not a consequential entitiy to its members or that 
the unity of the group is doubtful.  Thus, a researcher might properly 
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choose to exclude from further analyses those groups having insufficient 
intermember agreement” (p. 296)   
There are at least two reasons why a decision to discard teams from further 
analyses solely on the basis of a low index of agreement could be unsound scientifically.  
The first reason is statistical; discarding teams leads to a loss of statistical power and an 
increase in the probability of committing a Type II error. The second, related but more 
important reason is conceptual.  Some research questions require the inclusion/retention 
of all groups—not just those groups who exhibit more “groupness” as evidenced through 
their strong consensus on the construct of interest.  A good example is the question of the 
relationship of cohesion to team success in sport.  Team success is not measured at the 
individual level; an aggregated response (i.e., a team’s winning percentage) must be used.  
Historically, researchers testing the relationship of team cohesion to team success have 
not shown interest in the question, “what is the relationship of cohesion to performance in 
those teams where members exhibit relatively good agreement on the degree to which 
their team is cohesive?”  
A recent meta-analysis has shown unequivocally that higher group cohesiveness 
in all of its manifestations—ATG-S, ATG-T, GI-S, and GI-T—is associated with greater 
team success (Carron, Colman, Wheeler & Stevens, 2002). If researchers contributing to 
the meta-analysis had used the criterion of rwg(j) = .50 to reflect “groupness” and support 
aggregation (and our data can be assumed to reflect population values), 35.5%, 26.0%, 
14.1%, and 15.6% of their sample would have been discarded for analyses of the 
relationship between performance and ATG-S, ATG-T, GI-S, and GI-T respectively.  It 
seems likely that the reduction in team differences in cohesion (and increased 
homogeneity in the sample) would have contributed to a dramatically different picture of 
the cohesion-performance relationship in sport    
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 In conclusion, a point that is important from the above discussion is that 
research decisions are based on a myriad of factors—some empirical, some conceptual.  
There is no gold standard available for researchers insofar as acceptable sample sizes, 
probability levels, and effect sizes. Questions concerning what is an acceptable index of 
agreement should be considered in a similar light. 
 The present study is largely a preliminary, descriptive examination of the nature of 
the shared beliefs that reflect several aspects of cohesion in sport groups.  To the best of our 
knowledge, the study represents the first statistical examinations of the level of shared 
agreement in cohesive groups, and as such, addresses part of Dion’s (2000) call for an 
examination of the index of agreement as part of the practice necessary for aggregation of 
individual member responses to the group level.  As Dion reminded us, “one perspective is 
that  “ cohesiveness … means different things for different groups with different goals and 
tasks” (p.22).  Thus, It would be informative if researchers continue to explore the notion of 
shared beliefs and search out the group factors that moderate and mediate shared beliefs in 
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1. Exceptions to this general rule were studies carried out independently by former 





Proportion of Responses to Each of the 9 Choices Available to Respondents on the Group 
Environment Questionnaire  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
ATGS .049 .043 .052 .042 .094 .063 .127 .173 .355 
ATGT .031 .036 .055 .058 .077 .064 .124 .201 .396 
GIS .038 .061 .091 .086 .141 .092 .162 .176 .154 
GIT .027 .037 .063 .071 .121 .101 .182 .209 .187 




Descriptive Statistics for the Index of Agreement (r(wg(j)) for the Scales of the Group 
Environment Questionnaire (n = 192 teams) 



















.563 + .273 .625 7.8 35.4 22.9 
Adjusted ATG-S .449 + .325 .508 22.9 49.5 17.2 
Nonadjusted 
ATG-T 
.621 + .275 .686 8.9 26.0 32.2 
Adjusted ATG-T .496 + .324 .557 17.7 42.7 22.4 
Nonadjusted GI-S .694 + .217 .763 2.1 14.1 41.6 
Adjusted GI-S .558 + .294 .658 11.5 32.8 23.4 
Nonadjusted GI-T .721 + .236 .806 3.6 15.6 53.6 
Adjusted GI-T .489 + .350 .606 26.0 42.2 22.9 
1. ATG-T = Individual attractions to the group-task; ATG-S = Individual attractions to 
the group-social; GI-T = Group integration-task; GI-S = Group integration-social.   
2. Responses on the Group Environment Questionnaire are provided on a 9-point scale; 















.561 + .27 .565 + .31 ns 
Adjusted ATG-S .439 + .32 .485 + .32 ns 
Nonadjusted ATG-T .590 + .29 .770 + .14 ns 
Adjusted ATG-T .459 + .33 .673 + .22 ns 
Nonadjusted GI-S .703 + .21 .658 + .24 ns 
Adjusted GI-S .573 + .28 .497 + .35 ns 
Nonadjusted GI-T .718 + .23 .726 + .25 ns 
Adjusted GI-T .478 + .34 .531 + .35 ns 
ATG-T = Individual attractions to the group-task; ATG-S = Individual attractions to the 




















Individual Attractions to the Group-Task 
Low 
Cohesion 
64 5.83+.53 .422 .264 
Moderate 
Cohesion 
63 6.97+.27 .612 .453 
High 
Cohesion 
65 7.90+.30 .825 .764 
Individual Attractions to the Group-Social 
Low 
Cohesion 
64 5.93+.45 .415 .278 
Moderate 
Cohesion 
65 6.92+.18 .581 .462 
High 
Cohesion 




63 4.61+.60 .600 .466 
Moderate 
Cohesion 
64 5.96+.36 .654 .489 







64 5.44+.48 .642 .356 
Moderate 
Cohesion 
65 6.48+.21 .690 .438 
High 
Cohesion 
63 7.31+.24 .829 .670 
1. Responses on the cohesion scales could vary from 1 (low cohesiveness) to 9 (high 
cohesiveness) 
 
